Explaining Lebanese Shii adherence to Hezbollah: alienation,religiosity and welfare provision

Data from a cross-sectional survey of 176 Lebanese Shiis living in Metropolitan Beirut have been used to investigate the relationship between social and religious variables and attitudes toward Lebanon's “Party of God” (Hezbollah). The results indicate that Islamic religiosity, political discontent, and access to social welfare are positively associated with endorsement of the party. The implications of these findings for the party's future in light of recent political developments are discussed.     

THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF AUTOMATED RESPONSES DURING CYBERWARFARE

Automated responses are an inevitable aspect of cyberwarfare, but there has not been a systematic treatment of the conditions in which they are morally permissible. We argue that there are three substantial barriers to the moral permissibility of an automated response: the attribution, chain reaction, and projection bias problems. Moreover, these three challenges together provide a set of operational tests that can be used to assess the moral permissibility of a particular automated response in a specific situation. Defensive automated responses will almost always pass all three challenges, while offensive automated responses typically face a substantial positive burden in order to overcome the chain reaction and projection bias challenges. Perhaps the most interesting cases arise in the middle ground between cyber-offense and cyber-defense, such as automated cyber-exploitation responses. In those situations, much depends on the finer details of the response, the context, and the adversary. Importantly, however, the operationalizations of the three challenges provide a clear guide for decision-makers to assess the moral permissibility of automated responses that could potentially be implemented.     

Jihad or qatal? Examining Al Qaeda's modus operandi

There is widespread acknowledgment that the modus operandi of jihadis affiliated with Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) relies on brutal terror-inducing tactics which, more often than not, target Muslim and non-Muslim non-combatants. This article comparatively analyzes the AQAM modus operandi within the traditional stipulations of Islamic precepts with respect to waging jihad al saghir. The purpose is to glean whether or not such tactics such as suicide bombings, declaring fellow Muslim apostates in order to kill them, use of IEDs and EFPs to target civilians, constitute legitimate rules of engagement in jihad al saghir.     

Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.     

Countering global insurgency

This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist 1 1 In this article, the term ‘Islamist’ describes the extremist, radical form of political Islam practiced by some militant groups, as distinct from ‘Islamic’, which describes the religion of Islam, or ‘Muslim’, which describes those who follow the Islamic religion. In this article the term is used to refer primarily to Al Qaeda, its allies and affiliates. View all notes insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of ‘disaggregation’ that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad.2 2 This article uses the short form of the Islamic term jihad to mean ‘lesser jihad’ (armed struggle against unbelievers), rather than ‘greater jihad’ (jihad fi sabilillah), i.e. moral struggle for the righteousness of God. View all notes Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war – a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013